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Beller: United States v. MacDonald: The Exigent Circumstances Exception a

COMMENT

UNITED STATES V MACDONALD:

1

THE EXIGENT

CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION AND THE
EROSION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2
I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the apparently clear mandate of the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States,3 courts have fashioned exceptions to the warrant requirement that allow law enforcement officers to effect searches and seizures without prior judicial authorization.4 One of these exceptions is the "exigent circumstances" doctrine.5 As early as 1948, the Supreme Court recognized that there

1. 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
2. This phrase is taken from Chief Judge Oakes' dissent in United States v. Cattouse,
846 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 929 (1988), another exigent circumstances
case upholding a warrantless entry into a private home.
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wan-ants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Some exceptions that will not be addressed in this Comment are: consent, see
United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985); the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); and the
automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991). See generally
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 n.2
(1991).
5. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
1
298-99 (1967).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "exigence" or "exigency," in part, as "demand, want,
need, imperativeness; any event or occasional combination of circumstances calling for immediate action or remedy; a pressing necessity; pressing need or demand; case requiring immediate attention; critical period or condition; state of being urgent or exigent." BLACK'S LAW
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sometimes arise "exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it
contended that a magistrate's warrant may be dispensed
may be
6
with."1
However, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance." 7 In Payton v.
New York,8 the Court reaffirmed this principle:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety
of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms .... 9
The warrant requirement, mandating authorization by an impartial
magistrate based upon probable cause, balances the interest in privacy
in one's home with the public need for effective law enforcement.1"
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
DICTIONARY 514 (5th ed. 1979).
The exigent circumstances doctrine differs from the "emergency doctrine," which has
been defined as follows:
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without either an arrest or
search warrant to preserve life or property, to render first aid and assistance, or to
conduct a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, provided they have reasonable
grounds to believe that there is an urgent need for such assistance and protective
action, or to promptly launch a criminal investigation involving a substantial threat
of imminent danger to either life, health, or property, and provided, further, that
they do not enter with an accompanying intent to either arrest or search.
Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under
the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 426 (1972); Melinda Roberts, Note, The
Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and The Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 571, 581 (1975).
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
7. Id. at 14.
8. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
9. Id. at 585.
10. See Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L. L 283, 286 (1987);
Stuntz, supra note 4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss2/5

2

Beller: United States v. MacDonald: The Exigent Circumstances Exception a
UNITED STATES V. MACDONALD

1991]

crime."

In this context, the exigent circumstances exception was created
to address those situations in which any delay by law enforcement
officers would pose a risk of physical harm or imminent destruction
of evidence in a serious crime. 2 Recently, however, it has been liberally and perhaps unconstitutionally applied, particularly in narcotics
cases, to ward off defendants' suppression of evidence motions in
situations where there was no real exigency prior to police action. 3
This Comment analyzes one such case, United States v.
MacDonald,4 a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Briefly, MacDonald involved the forcible, warrantless entry into a private dwelling to effect the arrests of
suspects for narcotics trafficking and the subsequent search of the premises, during which the evidence at issue on appeal was discovered.' 5 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence
found during the warrantless search, holding that the warrantless entry
and search were justified by exigent circumstances. 6
The appeal from the Southern District was originally heard by a
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit composed of Chief Judge Oakes and Judges Kearse and
Altimari.17 The panel decision, reported as United States v. Thomas,is reversed the district court's holding that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry into defendant MacDonald's apart-

11. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
12. Salken, supra note 10, at 287 n.20.
"Exigent circumstances" is the Supreme Court's category for events not falling into the other specific exceptions but nonetheless requiring immediate action.
This exception allows for a warrantless search or seizure where there is a compelling need for immediate official action and time does not permit the procurement
of a warrant. The Court considers the facts of each case to determine whether it is
a "now or never" situation. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
451-56 (1948).
Id. The McDonald case cited above is a different case from the one that is the focus of this
Comment.
13. See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1514-17 (11th Cir. 1991) (Clark, Circuit
Judge, dissenting). United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 148-50 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, Circuit
Judge, dissenting), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 922 (1988).
14. 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
15. Id. at 768-69. See infra notes 102-31 and accompanying text.
16. Id. at 769.
17. United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1990).
18. Id.
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ment. 9 Rehearing en banc was granted, and oral arguments were
heard in June, 1990. The majority of the Second Circuit affirned the
district court, rejecting the reasoning of the original panel's holding.20 Judge Altimari, who had dissented from the original panel in
Thomas, drafted the majority opinion," and Judge Kearse, who had
written the original panel's opinion,2 drafted the MacDonald dissent,
joined by Chief Judge Oakes and Judge Feinberg.'
MacDonald provides an excellent framework for examining the
exigent circumstances doctrine, for it illustrates the potentially farreaching impact and application of this exception to the warrant requirement. This Comment will first discuss the specific facts of
MacDonald. Next, it will outline the law governing the exigent circumstances exception, and will provide discussion of a number of
cases as a basis of comparison. Finally, this Comment will analyze
the MacDonald decision itself in light of the applicable law and policy considerations.
II.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: AN OVERVIEW

A.

The Supreme Court Test

Although the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement has been the subject of divergent and contradictory decisions by district and appellate courts and of a number of scholarly
articles, the United States Supreme Court has never clearly defined its
contours. Recently, the Court observed that a state court had applied
the proper test in determining that exigent circumstances did not
justify a warrantless entry.24 The test had required probable cause to
believe one of the following circumstances existed: imminent destruction of evidence, the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk
of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the
dwelling. In addition, the Court noted "that in assessing the risk of
danger, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is
armed should be considered. . .. "'
This test clearly requires urgency, or the need for immediate

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 491.
MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 773.
Id. at 766-73.
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 482.
MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 773-77.
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
Id. at 97.
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action. Only in the face of truly exigent circumstances is the Supreme
Court willing to forego the warrant requirement. However, as this
Comment will show, this type of urgency was not present in the facts
of MacDonald.
B.

The Second Circuit Test

All of the circuit courts agree that danger of physical harm and
destruction of evidence are exigent circumstances that may justify
warrantless action.26 However, the circuit courts have established
different tests for exigent circumstances. 27 In United States v.
Dorman,2 8 the District of Columbia Circuit set forth a list of factors
to serve as guideposts in a determination of exigency.29 These factors, applied by the Second Circuit in MacDonald," are summarized
as follows:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is "reasonably believed to be armed"; (3) "a clear showing of probable cause ... to
believe that the suspect committed the crime"; (4) "a strong reason
to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered"; (5) "a
likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended";
and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry.3"

26. See generally Salken, supra note 10 (discussing the different approaches of the
circuits and the elements that the different tests have in common).
27. Id. at 287-88. Salken categorizes these tests into three groups. The first is the
examine-avoid" approach, which critically analyzes an officer's claim of exigent circumstances and requires that officers avoid warrantless action when possible. Id. at 288. The First,
Third and Fourth Circuits fall into this most protective category. Id. at 303. The second
group is the "uncritical approach," in which courts accept at face value an officer's assertion
of exigency and do not affirmatively require police to avoid warrantless action when possible.
Id. at 288. The Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits follow this analysis. Id. at
311. The third category is the "examine only" approach, which involves critical analysis of
the claim of exigency but does not affirmatively require avoidance of warrantless action. Id.
at 288. This group includes the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Id. at 314.
Since the Second Circuit in MacDonald applied a test from the D.C. Circuit, see infra
note 134 and accompanying text, the classification outlined above is not particularly useful
for this analysis.
28. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane).
29. Id. at 392-93.
30. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 769-70.
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 913 (1978)); Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392-93.
It is interesting to note that, although the Second Circuit cites the destruction of
evidence as a single "Dorman factor" justifying a warrantless entry or search, it fails to list
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The Second Circuit, in analyzing the Dorman factors, has stated
that they "are not intended as an exhaustive canon, but as an illustrative sampling of the kind of facts to be taken into account.132 Furthermore, the court has held that the presence of one factor may be
sufficient for a finding of exigency. 33 Yet "the essential question. . . is whether law enforcement agents were confronted by an
'urgent need' to render aid or take action." 34
Case law in several of the circuits, including the Second Circuit,
has also established that law enforcement officers cannot create the
exigent circumstances upon which they later attempt to rely to seek to
validate a warrantless entry, search, or seizure.3 5 In United States v.
Segura,3 6 the leading case on point, the Second Circuit held that the
exigent circumstances claimed to validate a warrantless entry were
impermissibly created by the officers involved.3 1 In Segura, the police had arrested one of two suspects at the entrance to the apartment
building that was to be entered.3 8 The other suspect was believed to
be in the apartment that was under surveillance. 39 The agents then
forced the arrested suspect to the door of the apartment, thus alerting
the occupant inside to the agents' involvement.4" But for this action
by the police, the suspect inside the apartment would have had no
reason to dispose of the narcotics that were the subject of the investigation." Therefore, the Second Circuit held that the claimed exigen-

this factor in its summary. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770. (noting that "sometimes the
presence of a solitary factor suffices, see, e.g., United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76,
79-80 (2d Cir. 1987) (destruction of evidence)").
32. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Dorman, 435 F.2d at 391). A district court's determination as to
whether exigent circumstances existed is fact-specific and will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous. Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 146. See also Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. at 95.
The district court's test is an objective one that turns on the totality of the circumstances confronting law enforcement agents in the particular case. See United States v.
Schaper, 903 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Miles, 889 F.2d 382, 383 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282, 290-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
856 (1989).
35. See United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd on other
grounds, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Allard II); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974).
36. Segura, 663 F.2d 411.
37. Id. at 414-15.
38. Id. at 413; see also infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
39. Segura, 663 F.2d at 413.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir. 1990); United
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cies would not be permitted to validate the warrantless entry."
C. Cases Analyzing the Exigent Circumstances Exception
To provide a foundation to analyze the MacDonald decision, it is
necessary to examine several cases in which the exigent circumstances
doctrine was at issue. The following are but a few of the many cases
in this area.
1. Cases Finding Exigent Circumstances
In United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez,4 3 the Second Circuit
cited several of the Dorman factors as the basis for justifying a warrantless entry." Since the suspect was aware of the agents' presence
outside the door and of their intent to enter, any delay in arresting
him would have jeopardized the agents' ability to confiscate incriminating evidence.45 The court also noted that the agents knew for certain that the suspect was inside and that he was in possession of a
weapon.46 The court limited a previous case, United States v.
Gomez,47 by holding that the presence of sounds likely to accompany the destruction of evidence, such as scurrying feet, running water,
and the flushing of a toilet,48 were not required for a finding of
exigent circumstances.49
The Second Circuit again applied the exigent circumstances exception to uphold a warrantless entry in United States v. Gallo-Roman.50 In Gallo-Roman, a United States Customs mail technician
intercepted mail that was found to contain cocaine. 51 The mailed
articles were forwarded to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") for
controlled delivery in New York.52 A claimant picked up one of the

States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1200-04 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105
(1985); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 318 (3d Cir. 1980).
42. Segura, 663 F.2d at 415 (quoting Allard HI, 634 F.2d at 1187).
43. 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982)
44. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 100-01.
45. Id. The incriminating evidence was related to drug trafficking. Id.
46. Id.
47. 633 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
48. Id. at 1002.
49. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 101. The court also noted, however, that the officers
heard the sound of a toilet flushing after they had opened the door to the dwelling and
before they had entered. Id.
50. 816 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 78. The substance was hidden between the front facing and back paper of
photographs. Id.
52. Id.
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packages at a post office and was followed to a residence by the
DEA agents, who then entered the apartment behind the suspect and
confiscated the evidence.53 The court held that, since the suspect
would have discovered the government's involvement when he opened
the package and realized that it had been tampered with, there was a
likelihood of imminent destruction of evidence, which validated the
otherwise unconstitutional entry and seizure.'
In United States v. Martino,5 5 the likelihood of destruction of
evidence was again cited as the factor that satisfied the exigent circumstances test.56 One suspect in a drug trafficking operation had
been arrested and others had fled from police.57 Since only two
DEA agents had been on the scene, one remained behind with the
apprehended suspect while the other pursued the co-conspirators.5 8
The pursuing agent, fearful that the fleeing felons would destroy
evidence, first retrieved a package containing narcotics from one
suspect's backyard, where an informant had stated that it had been
stashed. 59 The court held that the agent, required both to preserve
evidence and to catch the suspects," was fully justified in first confiscating the evidence, even though the agent had 61to make a warrantless entry onto private property in order to do so.
The threat of physical danger to an informant was the factor that

53. Id.
54. Id. at 79.
It was certainly reasonable for the agents to conclude that, once the envelope was opened, the false backs removed from the photographs, and the discovery
made that the photographs had been tampered with, it would become apparent that
the scheme had been uncovered and that the authorities were near. Under these
circumstances, the agents reasonably could have anticipated that the perpetrator
would act quickly to destroy the evidence of unlawful conduct. Therefore, because
possible destruction of the evidence was imminent, the agents did not violate the
fourth amendment in entering and searching the apartment.
Id.
55. 664 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110 (1982). The majority
opinion was written by Judge Kearse, who wrote the dissent in MacDonald.
56. Id. at 869-70.
57. Id. at 865.
58. Id. at 870.
59. Id.
60. Id. If the agent had guarded the yard, the suspects would have escaped. On the
other hand, if the agent had gone directly in pursuit of the suspects, one of the suspects
might have been able to retrieve the narcotics first and would have been likely to dispose of
the incriminating evidence. Id. at 869-70.
61. Id.
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justified a warrantless entry in United States v. Crespo.6 2 In Crespo,
agents who were concerned for the safety of an informant who had
been "found out" entered a suspect's apartment and effected an arrest
without a warrant.63 There was a' need for immediate action; had the
agents waited to obtain a warrant, there was a reasonable likelihood
that the informant would have been harmed. 4
The following two cases define the outer limits of the exigent
circumstances doctrine. In United States v. Cattouse,65 police arranged a controlled drug buy through an informant using marked
bills.' After the informant emerged from the suspect's apartment
building with the controlled substance, the agents entered the apartment without a warrant, seized the evidence, and arrested the suspect.67 Defendant Cattouse argued in a suppression hearing that the
agents themselves had created the threat of destruction of evidence by
using marked bills. 68 However, the court held that "[t]he likelihood
that the buy money would be removed from the apartment, the everincreasing risk that the agents would be detected,69 and the increasing danger of provoking a violent confrontation, fully justified the
agents' decision to make the arrest without first obtaining a warrant." 70 Distinguishing United States v. Segura,7 ' the court stated
that "the exigency arose not from the agents' conduct but because of
the suspect's activity." 2
The decision in United States v. Tobin,' a an Eleventh Circuit

62. 834 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988).

63. Id. at 269. The court also pointed out that the suspect had committed a grave
offense, i.e., threatening the informant, a government employee, was known to be armed,
might have escaped because only one agent was covering the back of the building, and also
might have destroyed evidence. Id. at 270-71; see also United States v. Dorman, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
64. Crespo, 834 F.2d at 271. The court never addressed the fact that the police could
have protected the informant by placing her in protective custody.
65. 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 929 (1988).
66. Id. at 145-46.
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id.
69. The agents were all white and the drug buy and subsequent arrest took place in a
predominantly black neighborhood. Id. at 145.
70. Id. at 148. But see id. at 148-50 (Oakes, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
71. 663 F.2d 411; see also infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
72. Canouse, 846 F.2d at 148. This conclusion is without basis in the record. If the
agents had not used marked money, or had first obtained a warrant so that they would be
ready to make an arrest immediately following the controlled buy, there would not have been
a threat of destruction of evidence.
73. 923 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.) (en banc), reh g en bane denied, 935 F.2d 1297, cert.
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case, also tests the boundaries of the exigent circumstances doctrine.
In Tobin, three agents, while in the course of an unrelated surveillance, observed defendant Tobin remove clear plastic tubular bags
from the trunk of his car and enter a house with a second defendant.74 The agents, believing the bags to contain cocaine, knocked
on the door of the house until it was opened by one of the defendants.75 When the man retreated into the house, an agent followed
him in. 76 Upon seeing the open bag and determining that it was cocaine, the agents arrested Tobin and the second defendant.' Although noting that "[c]ircumstances are not normally considered exigent where the suspects are unaware of police surveillance,"78 the
court upheld the warrantless entry.7 9 The court concluded that "the
agents could reasonably conclude from the defendants' hurried actions
and furtive looks that the defendants were either aware or afraid that
someone was watching them."8
2. Cases Finding No Exigent Circumstances
In United States v. Segura,"' law. enforcement agents had maintained a surveillance of defendants Segura and Colon for about a
month.82 When the agents saw the defendants deliver a package believed to contain cocaine, the agents stopped, questioned, and arrested
the recipients. The officers then began a surveillance of Segura's
apartment.8 4 Segura entered the building alone and was apprehended.8 5 The agents took Segura forcibly to the second-floor apartment
and, without permission, entered. 6 Colon was inside.87 Once in the
apartment, the agents discovered evidence of drug trafficking. 8 The
officers testified at trial that they had observed neither lights nor

denied, 112 S. Ct. 299 (1991).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1508.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. But see id. at 1514-17 (Clark, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981), afid, 468 U.S. 796 (1983).
Id. at 413.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1511 (citations omitted).

Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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sounds inside the apartment.8 9 The Second Circuit, affirming the district court's finding that the entry was not justified by exigent circumstances, held that a warrantless search could be justified only when
law enforcement agents have a reasonable belief that someone is
within the dwelling and that the person inside is aware of the
government's involvement. 9°
Using similar reasoning, the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Collazo9' held that exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless entry. 2 In Collazo, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents entered a private residence without a warrant, hoping to find a suspect
who had not appeared at an undercover drug buy at which his cohorts had been arrested. 93 The court held that the officers, who were

concerned about the destruction of evidence, should have obtained
warrants prior to the arrests of the co-felons. 94 The court also noted
that, since the building was already under surveillance, any chance of
escape was minimal, and that the agents had adequate probable cause
to request and obtain a search warrant.95 Furthermore, the court held

89. Id.
90. Id. at 414-15. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982);
supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. In Martinez-Gonzalez, the Second Circuit held that
the warrantless entry was justified because the suspect inside the dwelling was aware of the
agents' surveillance and intent to enter.
Requiring knowledge of government involvement relates to the likelihood that evidence
may be destroyed; if the suspect inside the dwelling is aware of police surveillance, it is
reasonable to expect imminent destruction of evidence. The converse, that a suspect unaware
of police surveillance will not destroy evidence, is also true absent other unusual circumstances.
91. 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
92. Id. at 1204.
93. Id. at 1202-03.
94. Id. at 1204. -The government will not be allowed to plead its own lack of preparation to create an exigency justifying warrantless entry." Id.
95. Id. While some courts have held that the ability of officers to obtain a warrant
prior to the warrantless entry does not impact upon the exigent circumstances analysis, e.g.,
Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 147, other courts seem to consider this factor, e.g., Gallo-Roman,
816 F.2d 76, 81 (exigent circumstances were not mitigated by failure to obtain warrant
because suspect's address was unknown). Even in Canouse, the court makes mention of the
fact that the officers did not know the suspect's name. Canouse, 846 F.2d at 145. See
MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 776 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting) ("I do not believe we should
allow law enforcement officers who have probable cause early to tarry and then justify a
warrantless entry on the basis of the lateness of the hour.").
This issue is perhaps at the heart of the exigent circumstances doctrine. If there is
sufficient time and probable cause to obtain a warrant before effecting a warrantless entry,
without risk of harm or destruction of evidence, then there is no real exigency. Cf United
States v. Rivera, 762 F. Supp. 49, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The facts at bar show that the
officers had enough time to obtain a search warrant prior to the arrest, and since there were
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that the officers' actions in entering the house "created a situation of
danger at least comparable to that which might have been presented
by a fleeing suspect.""
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply the exigent circumstances
exception in United States v. Allard.97 In Allard, Drug Enforcement
Agency agents arrested defendant Allard at his home pursuant to a
warrant, but failed to find contraband at his residence.98 The agents
then, on a tip, requested entry to a hotel room from the occupant
who had co-registered for the room with Allard." The occupant,
who, prior to the agents' arrival, had no knowledge of Allard's arrest,.
acquiesced to the entry but refused to permit a search of the
° The court held that the subsequent
room."
seizure did not fall under the exigent circumstances exception since there was no reason for
the agents to believe that the suspect would have destroyed evidence
prior to their request to enter.' 0'

III. FACTS OF MACDONALD 1 2
In May, 1988, a reliable confidential informant told the New
York Drug Enforcement Task Force that narcotics were being stored
in apartment 1-0 of 321 Edgecombe Avenue in Manhattan ("321
Edgecombe") and in another unidentified apartment in the building. 3 On the evening of September 8, Task Force agents set up a
surveillance of 321 Edgecombe." 4 The group of agents was ethnically mixed, and blended in with the population of the area.0" In
no exigent circumstances excusing it, the officers were compelled to obtain a warrant under
the circumstances.").
For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of the warrant requirement, see
Stuntz, supra note 4.
96. Collazo, 732 F.2d at 1204.
97. 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (Allard 1), affd on reh'g, 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.
1980) (Allard II).
98. Allard I, 600 F.2d at 1302.
99. Id. at 1303.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1304. In a footnote, the court distinguished the government's principal case,
United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1977). In Fulton, the defendant was arrested
directly outside and in view of a hotel room in which officers believed a co-defendant was
present and in possession of heroin. The Ninth Circuit held that exigent circumstances existed
because of the likelihood of destruction of evidence. See Allard 1, 600 F.2d at 1304 n.2.
102. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768-69. The facts were undisputed. See Thomas, 893 F.2d
at 483; MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
103. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 775 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting). Compare Thomas, 893 F.2d at 485
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addition, the agents' vehicles were unmarked and inconspicuous. 6
The agents, joined by DEA Special Agent Agee, observed a
steady succession of cars drive up to the building, double-park, and
wait as passengers went inside 321 Edgecombe and emerge shortly
thereafter. 7 Between about 6:50 p.m. and 9:40 p.m., the agents
observed some fifteen to twenty such occurrences."' Agent Agee
followed several individuals into the building and saw them enter and
exit apartment 1-0.'09 One individual was observed placing something in the gas cap of his car before driving away from 321
Edgecombe." 0 At about 9:30 p.m., agents followed one car until it
was out of sight of the building, then stopped and questioned the
occupants."' The occupants confirmed that several individuals inside
apartment 1-0 were selling narcotics" 2 and informed the agents that
sales were not limited to regular customers." 3
Based upon this information, Agent Agee telephoned his supervisor, who authorized Agee to attempt to effectuate an undercover
narcotics buy with pre-recorded money." 4 At approximately 9:50
p.m., Agent Agee knocked on the door of apartment 1-0 and was
admitted." 5 Once inside, Agee observed six men, including defendants Thomas and MacDonald," 6 and what was later confirmed to
be bags of marijuana and cocaine, in plain sight." 7 The apartment

with Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 147-48.
106. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 775 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting). The cars were so
indistinguishable that one of the agents testified that he could not identify any but his own.
Id.
107. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 483.
108. This fact does not appear in either the Thomas or the MacDonald opinions, but was
established at trial. Brief for the Appellee, dkt. no. 89-1262 [hereinafter Brief for the Appellee].
109. Id.
110. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 483.
111. En Banc Brief for the Appellee, dkt. no. 89-1262, at 4 [hereinafter En Banc Brief
for the Appellee].
112. Id. It is likely that the agents would have had probable cause to obtain a warrant at
this point in their investigation. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (defining probable
cause).

113. En Bane Brief for the Appellee at 5.
114. Id. The serial number of the bill given to the defendants in exchange for the
controlled substance was recorded prior to the transaction. Id.
115. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. This entry was authorized by consent of the occupant.
See supra note 4 (consent is another exception to the warrant requirement).
116. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. Only defendant MacDonald appealed the district
court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence obtained in the warrantless search. Id.
117. Id.
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smelled of marijuana smoke, although no one was observed smoking."' Thomas, who was closest to the bags of marijuana and cocaine, was holding a nine-millimeter pistol, aimed in Agee's general
direction about four feet from his head. 1 9 MacDonald, within reach
of a .357 magnum revolver, was seated on a couch counting a large
amount of cash."12 The windows of the apartment overlooked
Edgecombe Avenue.'
Agee purchased a five-dollar bag of marijuana with the pre-recorded bill and left the apartment.1 2 A few minutes later, at about
10:00 p.m., Agee and six other agents approached apartment 1-0 with
guns drawn, carrying a battering ram.2 3 The agents knocked, identified themselves as police officers, and asked to speak with the occupants of the apartment. 4 There was no direct response, but the
agents testified that they heard the sounds of shuffling feet within the
apartment."n Via radio, the agents were told by officers on the
street that the suspects were escaping through windows onto
Edgecombe Avenue. 2 6 Using the battering ram, the agents forcibly
entered the apartment. 7 They apprehended five men and seized

118. Id. "The suggestion that the suspects themselves had been smoking marijuana in the
apartment goes beyond the record." Id. at 775 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting). But see
Thomas, 893 F.2d at 492 (Altimari, Circuit Judge, dissenting) (stating that "It]he highly
volatile mix of loaded weapons with drug abuse created an emergency situation that could
explode at any moment.").
119. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
120. Id.
121. Brief for the Appellee.
122. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. Agee could have effected a legal arrest while inside.
See United States v. Rivera, 762 F. Supp. 49, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). "Under certain circumstances, the use of stratagem or deception to obtain evidence is permissible even in the
absence of a warrant. For example, an undercover agent posing as a drug purchaser may
enter a person's home to make an illegal drug purchase." Id. (citing Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966)). Cf. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 773 (Kearse, Circuit Judge,
dissenting) ("Having probable cause for arrest, Agee could indeed have arrested them lawfully

at that point, but that power was unrelated to any exigent circumstances; he could have
arrested them then because he was lawfully in the apartment by reason of their consent.")
(citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 576; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)). However,
once Agee left the apartment, the consent terminated, and new consent would be required to
re-enter. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
123. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 483.
124. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
125. Id. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
126. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
127. Brief for the Appellee. The majority in MacDonald held that this satisfied the sixth
Dorman factor, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, because it was "an attempt by the
agents to enter peacefully." MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 773.
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two weapons, a quantity of marijuana and cocaine, a large amount of
cash, including the pre-recorded five dollar bill, and other evidence
associated with drug trafficking.12
Agee testified at trial that he did not believe that he had been
recognized as an agent by anyone in the apartment, and that he had
not observed any counter-surveillance by the suspects. 9 He also
stated that he believed a warrant would have taken at least two hours
to be issued, and that the agents feared that the evidence might be
destroyed during this time period. "' Agee further testified that it
would have been possible for the suspects to move the evidence to
the other unidentified location in the building.'
IV.

MACDONALD: DISCUSSION

The majority opinion is premised on two separate findings: first,
that exigent circumstances existed prior to the officers' knocking on
the door to apartment 1-0;132 and second, that even if the circumstances were not exigent prior to the knock on the door, the officers'
actions were appropriate and thus did not impermissibly create the
exigent circumstances that followed.'33 This discussion will show
that both of these conclusions are wrong. Interestingly, if the
majority's first conclusion, that exigent circumstances existed prior to
the knock, was correct, the second premise would be moot. Thus, this
part of the opinion is actually dicta.
A.

Exigent Circumstances Before the Knock

Applying the Dorman test," 4 the majority reasons that "numerous factors support... [the] conclusion that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry."' 3 5 It is true that some of the
Dorman factors were met. The suspects were clearly armed, 136 the
agents had probable cause to believe that the suspects were commit-

128. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 483; MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
129. Brief for the Appellee.
130. Id. See also Thomas, 893 F.2d at 485. An objective basis for the belief that evidence might be destroyed is required. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 774 (Kearse, Circuit Judge,
dissenting).
131. Id. at 775.
132. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
135. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 773.
136. Id. at 768.
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ting an illegal act,137 and the suspects were known to be in the
1 38
apartment.
The majority also asserts that "the ongoing sale and distribution
of narcotics constituted a grave offense." 139 However, the sale of
narcotics is a grave offense in the aggregate because of its overall
detrimental effect on society, not due to the dangers it poses from
one transaction. In her dissent, Judge Kearse stated that
[t]he principal factor relied on by the majority in the present case to
reach the conclusion that there was an urgent need to enter without
a warrant is that narcotics trafficking is a grave offense. Indeed it
is; but though certain types of crimes, such as attempted murder or
arson, create an inherent exigency while in progress, narcotics trafficking is not of that genre. There has never been an exigent circumstances exception permitting
a warrantless entry simply because
40
the offense involves narcotics.1
The majority further reasons that "the volatile mix of drug sales,
loaded weapons and likely drug abuse presented a clear and immediate danger to the law enforcement agents and the public at
large." 1' However, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the suspects were themselves using drugs other than Agee's
testimony that he smelled marijuana in the apartment.1 42 The presence of weapons posed no danger if the suspects had no reason to
use them, and certainly did not pose a threat to agents who were
unknown to the suspects and were outside the building.

137. Id. The suspects were charged with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. sections 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. section 2, and with use of a
firearm in connection with a narcotics offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c).
Defendant MacDonald was convicted of these offenses by a jury. See Thomas, 893 F.2d 482.
138. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
139. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
140. Id. at 775 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting); see also Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 149
(Oakes, Circuit Judge, dissenting):
I am also troubled by the majority's willingness to find exigent circumstances
based largely on generalizations about the habits and practices of drug dealers . . . . So, with the general knowledge that drug dealers often use guns, lookouts, and runners, all that is needed to create an exigence is an operation using
marked buy money, probable cause, and a strong possibility that the suspect is in
the apartment to be entered. Perhaps we should be more forthright and say that the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is simply inapplicable in drug buy cases.
Id.
141. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
142. Id. at 768. See supra note 118. Furthermore, the use of marijuana has never been
linked to increased tendencies toward violence.
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The majority also states that there was a likelihood that the
suspects would escape, since the man who had made the sale to Agee
"apparently" had escaped after Agee's purchase and before the warrantless entry. 4 3 However, this could not have been known to the
officers at the time they entered the building to make their arrest,
since there is no testimony that they saw this suspect escape. The
exception requires that officers have an objective basis to believe that
an urgent need required immediate action"
Furthermore, the majority states that "the agents acted in accordance with the law, and first attempted to effect a peaceful entry by
knocking and announcing themselves." 145 However, the fact that the
officers knocked politely before demolishing the door with a battering
ram cannot re-characterize this entry as peaceful. The central factor to
be considered in determining the character of the entry is "the peaceful circumstances of the entry, ' 146 not the circumstances prior to
that entry.
Finally, the majority held that
the district court's finding that the agents were confronted by an
urgent need to prevent the possible loss of evidence cannot be said
to be clearly erroneous in light of the information that the suspects
were using an unidentified apartment in the building to store narcotics, the ease with which the suspects could have disposed of the
cocaine by flushing it down the toilet, and the possibility that the
prerecorded five dollar bill used by Agent Agee in the undercover
were permitted
buy would be lost if the ongoing drug transactions
147
to continue while the agents sought a warrant.
However, the court fails to explain why the suspects, who had conducted an ongoing operation from that location for at least four
months, 148 would suddenly choose to dispose of the narcotics unless
they became aware of the agents' surveillance. 49 Furthermore, there

143. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
144. See id. at 774 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d
412 (2d Cir. 1978).
145. MacDonald. 916 F.2d at 770.
146. Id. at 769-70.
147. Id. at 770.
148. Police first 'learned that drug trafficking was taking place at 321 Edgecombe in
May, and the night of the arrest was September 8th of the same year. Id. at 768.
149. Id. at 776 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting) ("There was simply nothing in the
record to suggest that the suspects would suddenly, after at least four months of operation,
start to destroy their business assets.")
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was no basis for a belief that the suspects would move to another
apartment. And while there was a possibility that the pre-recorded bill
might be given to another purchaser as "change," this one fact does
not amount to an exigency. In addition, the agents could have conducted another undercover purchase with a new pre-recorded bill
immediately upon obtaining a warrant to ensure that they would have
this kind of evidence.
There is insufficient factual support to establish exigency in
MacDonald. Unlike the suspects in Tobin, MacDonald and his codefendants exhibited no behavior that indicated that they were aware
of, or even suspected, the agents' presence and activity.'5 Neither
the agents nor their vehicles were conspicuous, Agent Agee's profession was not revealed to the suspects during the drug buy, and the
questioning of the people who had purchased drugs in the apartment
was conducted out of eyesight of the suspects.' 5' Unlike the circumstances in Gallo-Roman, where the suspect was bound to discover
that his package had been tampered with,"5 2 and in Cattouse, where
the bills used to make the undercover buy were marked and not prerecorded,'53 nothing the agents had done up to the point at which
they knocked on the door could have possibly, alerted the defendants
to government involvement. Ironically, the absence of exigent circumstances was due to the high quality of police work in this case, which
turned sour upon the agents' knock on the door to apartment 1-0.
B.

Exigent CircumstancesAfter the Knock

Clearly, after the agents knocked on the door of the apartment,
exigent circumstances were present because the suspects were then
aware of police presence and, in fact, attempted to escape.' 4 The
majority argues that this action by the agents was permissible because
it was not illegal.
Exigent circumstances are not to be disregarded simply because the
suspects chose to respond to the agents' lawful conduct by attempting to escape, destroy evidence, or engage in any other unlawful
activity. The fact that the suspects may reasonably be expected to
behave illegally does not prevent law enforcement agents from

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See supra notes
MacDonald, 916
See supra notes
See supra notes
MacDonald, 916

73-80 and accompanying text.
F.2d at 768.
50-54 and accompanying text.
65-72 and accompanying text.
F.2d at 768.
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acting lawfully to afford the suspects the opportunity to do so.

Thus, assuming arguendo that there were no exigent circumstances
before the knock, the agents' conduct did not impermissibly create
the circumstances occurring thereafter. 5 '
The court distinguishes Segura'5 6 on several grounds. First, the
court characterizes the agents' behavior in Segura as "contrived,"
behavior that was "far different [from] the agents' compliance with
the law involved here. 15 7 Yet the behavior of the agents here,
when they approached a door behind which there were known drug
dealers, knocked, and announced that they were police, all the while
with guns drawn and battering ram in hand, was at least as contrived
58
as the behavior of the agents in Segura.1
Next, the majority states that the subjective state of mind of the
officers involved is irrelevant to an objective analysis of the circumstances.'5 9 But unlike in Cattouse, in which the agents' use of
marked buy money and an all-white surveillance team were "appropriate investigative techniques,"' 6 the agents' conduct in MacDonald
served no legitimate investigatory purpose. By knocking on the door,
the officers left only two lawful options open to the occupants: to
consent to the entry or to refuse the entry until a warrant could be
obtained. The first, albeit unlikely, would have led to a permissible
entry.161 The second option would have resulted in a warrantless
and non-consensual entry, for even if the suspects had not attempted
to flee, once alerted to the agents' presence, there would have been a
reasonable basis for believing that evidence would be destroyed, even

155. Id. at 771.
156. 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
157. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
158. See id. at 768; see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
159. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
160. Canouse, 846 F.2d at 148.
161. See supra note 115.
It was not objectively reasonable for the officers to hold any belief that suspects
who took such precautions during an apparently innocuous buy would voluntarily
consent to a search by law enforcement officers. Since the agents' suggestion that
they returned because they thought they could gain entrance to search by consent
defies credulity, and since the agents plainly anticipated that the announcement of
their identity would precipitate an exigency, for they came armed with a battering
ram. . . . the agents must be regarded as having deliberately created the exigency
precisely to justify their warrantless entry. We should not endorse such contrivances
by law enforcement officials in their efforts to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.
MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 776 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
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if that was not the suspects' intent. Therefore, when the officers
knocked on the apartment door, entry was inevitable.' 62 By permitting an entry under these circumstances, the court creates a new and
easy way to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
Law enforcement agents need only knock on a door and announce
themselves before they can effect a valid warrantless entry.
Finally, the court severely limited Segura, holding that "when
law enforcement agents act in an entirely lawful manner, they do not
impermissibly create exigent circumstances." 63 Yet the conduct in
Segura itself, taking a suspect in custody to an apartment he was
known to occupy, is not illegal. In addition, denying application of
the exigent circumstances exception only in cases where the police
create exigent circumstances through illegal acts begs the question at
issue; namely, was the police conduct lawful in entering private property without a warrant'! According to the majority, if the knock is
lawful, the entry is lawful. Since, however, the warrantless entry is
presumptively unlawful," 6 officers should not be permitted such a
broad range of conduct from which they could permissibly create
exigencies on which to justify a warrantless entry. Applying the
court's rationale in MacDonald, police could justify a warrantless
search and seizure in any drug-related case on an exigent circumstance exception, provided that the police conduct is not unlawful.
C. Extended Consent
Although Agent Agee could have effected an arrest while in
apartment 1-0,'65 the government in MacDonald argued that this
consent should be extended to cover Agee's brief absence from the
apartment so that, when he returned with reinforcements, he could
enter lawfully without a warrant. This argument, endorsed by a majority of the court,' 66 is both revolutionary and misplaced. There is
no case law to support this "extended consent" theory and, in fact,
there is case law that is contra-indicative. 67 This new approach per-

162. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 776 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
163. Id. at 772. "Law enforcement agents are required to be innocent but not naive." Id.
164. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
165. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
166. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771. "The undercover agent here did not need a warrant
to reenter the apartment within ten minutes, having exited only to secure proper protection by
obtaining reinforcements." Id.
167. See State v. Douglas, 365 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Wis. 1985) (holding that implied
consent to enter to render emergency assistance did not constitute authorization for a second
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mits law enforcement agents to effect warrantless entries any time
there has been prior consent-for example a previous undercover drug
buy. The majority fails to define adequately this new exception, setting neither time limits nor guidelines. 6 '
In addition, this new exception involves consent, and not the
exigent circumstances exception on which the majority bases its decision. But, as Judge Kearse noted, "[c]onsent and exigent circumstances are separate exceptions to the warrant requirement and should not
be confused."' 169 Perhaps the consent exception is vitiated by the
fact that this portion of the decision is dicta, since the majority holds
that exigent circumstances validate the entry. However, to make mention of this new extended consent theory, without legal support and
without adequate explanation, when the case is premised on a different exception, is beyond the scope of proper judicial authority.
V.

CONCLUSION

The MacDonald decision by the Second Circuit surreptitiously
weakens the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and is a bold
step in effecting the Bush Administration's war on drugs. 170 Although concern about drug trafficking in the United States is warranted,17 1 these judicial rulings are at odds with the Fourth Amendment
constitutional guarantees that are central to American society. As
Professor Wisotsky points out, "[t]he result of the War on Drugs is
thus a gradual, but inexorable, expansion of enforcement powers at
the expense of personal freedoms. The United States is measurably a
less free society than it was five or six years ago." 72

entry two days later); United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that "[a] consent to search is reasonable only if kept within the bounds of the actual
consent.") (citation omitted); Metcalf v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Del. 1985) (holding
that a suspect who initially consented to entry of home effectively withdrew consent when he
refused reentry to officers).
168. See MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771.
169. Id. at 773 (Kearse, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
170. See OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POU1CY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (1989) [hereinafter BENNETT PLAN).
171. A 1988 survey by the National Institute on Drug Abuse estimated that there were
14.5 million users of illegal drugs in the United States, see BENNETT PLAN, supra note 170,
while other reports estimate the figure to be as high as 37 million in 1987; see, e.g., TiE
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA, FINAL REPORT 1 (1988). See
generally Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HOPSTRA L.
REV. 501, 503-06 nn.8-23 (1990).
172. Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 909 (1987).
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In the context of MacDonald alone, the decision does not seem
so unfortunate. The defendants in MacDonald were culpable-they
were selling narcotics and were caught red-handed. However, our
system must work to protect all citizens equally. When courts weaken
the strength of basic constitutional principles, as the MacDonald court
did, the effect is on the nation as a whole, and not exclusively on
those who are responsible for the drug problem.
Implementation of the new, expanded exigent circumstances
exception by law enforcement agents is certain to result in increased
violations, both in numbers and scope, of constitutional rights. The
police, who become frustrated with the system requiring that they
present evidence to a neutral magistrate who makes an objective
determination that probable cause does or does not exist to issue a
warrant, and are particularly sensitive to the dangers of their work,
are likely to act prematurely. Thus, the exception, as applied on the
street, will continue to expand.
Even the majority opinion in MacDonald acknowledges the fact
that this newly-broadened exigent circumstances exception will apply
to uphold warrantless entries in almost every drug trafficking situation. "If it is true that ongoing retail narcotics operations often confront law enforcement-agents with exigent circumstances, we fail to
see how such a sad reality constitutes a ground for declaring that the
exigencies do not, in fact, exist."17 However, the majority's reasoning here begins with a conclusion-that exigent circumstances exist in
most drug trafficking cases. This is a presumption that should not be
made if we still value the wisdom of Payton and the Bill of Rights.
In his dissent in Cattouse, Judge Oakes wrote two eloquent sentences that apply equally to the MacDonald decision: "To my mind
the majority's willingness to expand the exigent circumstances exception is but another sad paragraph in a book that could be entitled The
Erosion of the Fourth Amendment. And I fear the chapters that have
yet to be written." 174
Amy B. Beller*

173. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772.
174. Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 150.
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Dwight Greene for his
editorial assistance and encouragement.
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